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1 INTRODUCTION
March 30, 2020, marked a milestone in political science. Until that date, conventional
wisdom in political science purported that wealthy democracies would not revert to author-
itarianism, at least without high levels of oil wealth. While a young democracy, Hungary
clearly met these conditions. The country began undergoing democratic erosion, the process
of government-led, gradual changes in the quality of democracy, in 2010 when Viktor Orbán
and the Fidesz party returned to power. By 2020, several major democracy indexes consid-
ered Hungary on the cusp of a hybrid regime including Economist Intelligence Unit (2020),
Freedom House (2020), and Varieties of Democracy Institute (2020). Hungary’s transforma-
tion to a hybrid regime was completed on March 30 when the coronavirus pandemic allowed
Fidesz to give Orbán emergency powers (Bakke, Mitchell, and Smidt 2020; Morris 2020).
Hungary is the prototypical example of a worldwide trend. Poland began experiencing
democratic backsliding in 2015 after Law and Justice (PiS) swept the parliamentary and
presidential elections. Turkey lost its status as a democracy in 2017 following president
Recep Tayyip Erdoǧan’s successful constitutional referendum to enhance his office’s pow-
ers. Perhaps the most significant example has been that of the United States (US), once
considered the bulwark of liberal democracy, where Donald Trump attacked democratic in-
stitutions and the legitimacy of his political opponents and continued to do so during his
presidency. Both Economist Intelligence Unit (2020) and Varieties of Democracy Institute
(2020) moved the US to a flawed regime during Trump’s presidency.
Figure 1 demonstrates the existence of a trend in recent years where several wealthy
democracies have experienced democratic erosion. This graph restricts countries to those
that qualify as wealthy and as democracies. It then takes the one-year change in the Varieties
of Democracy (V-Dem) polyarchy index and calculates the percentage of wealthy democracies
that experience a decline in the index over the past year. In the past decade, the total
number experiencing a decline has reached new highs despite having a larger number of
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Figure 1: Percentage of Wealthy Democracies Experiencing Decrease in Polyarchy Index By
Year
Sources: GDP per capita from Maddison Project (Bolt et al. 2018); democracy from Bjørnskov and Rode’s
(2020) coding of DD (Alvarez et al. 1996; Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010); and democratic erosion
from V-Dem polyarchy index (Coppedge et al. 2020a).
Notes: Countries are defined as wealthy if they have a GDP per capita greater than or equal to $8,349.69
in 2011 American dollars. Being coded as a democracy depends on the DD rules. Countries are included if
they meet both conditions that year or the previous year or if the year is 2017, 2018, or 2019 and qualified
in 2016. Democratic erosion is measured as the one year change in the polyarchy index multiplied by 100.
A country experiences democratic erosion if the change is negative and strong if at least -3.
wealthy democracies than at any other point—there were 11 in 1950 and 67 in 2017–19.
That means only six wealthy democracies experienced a decline in 1950 compared to 43 in
2017. I define a strong decline as one larger than three points (less than −3), more than
twice the first quartile of −1.2. The percentage facing strong declines has also peaked in the
past decade.
One of the most confounding aspects of democratic erosion is that several leaders have
survived despite their democracy-eroding actions. Despite presiding over significant demo-
cratic backsliding, prime minister Andrej Babǐs of the Czech Republic won reelection after
losing a motion of no confidence in 2018. Serbian prime minister Aleksander Vuçić left office
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to run for president where he has continued to exercise significant power. Polish president
Andrzej Duda narrowly held on to power during the presidential elections in June and July
2020, and the fate of Donald Trump is unknown although several political scientists believe
that his reelection is increasingly unlikely (Abramowitz 2020; Bitecofer 2020; “Forecasting
the US Elections,” n.d.).
Figure 2: Polarization Worldwide Over Time
Sources: GDP per capita from Maddison Project (Bolt et al. 2018); democracy from Bjørnskov and Rode’s
(2020) coding of DD (Alvarez et al. 1996; Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010); and polarization from
V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2020a).
Notes: Scope countries refer to wealthy democracries. Countries are defined as wealthy if they have a GDP
per capita greater than or equal to $8,349.69 in 2011 American dollars. Being coded as a democracy depends
on the DD rules. Countries are included if they meet both conditions that year or the previous year or if
the year is 2017, 2018, or 2019 and qualified in 2016.
Polarization has also trended upward over the past couple decades, much like democratic
erosion. Figure 2 displays how mean and median polarization, using V-Dem’s measurement,
has changed since 1950 among all coded countries and among all coded wealthy and demo-
cratic countries. Polarization for all countries, using either the median or mean, dipped
around 1990. Since 2010, it has risen to nearly pre-1990 highs. The pattern is clearest for
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wealthy democracies. Mean polarization in wealthy democracies decreased in 1980 and again
reached pre-1980 levels in 1990. It has only increased since 1990, reaching a new peak about
25% higher than the previous peak. Median polarization remained fairly low until about
2003 and has then doubled.
A major question is whether these trends are connected. In this thesis, I argue that
that they are related and use selectorate theory to link them. In short, polarization shifts
the focus of political competition to identity. These circumstances allow politicians to harm
democratic institutions yet avoid punishment. Voters approve of democratic erosion as a
means to keep other groups out of power. Even if they disapprove, they cannot bring
themselves to vote for another party. I test this theory with a series of survival models,
which provide some support.
The thesis proceeds as follows. Section 2 is a literature review split into two parts. The
first part focuses on selectorate theory and the second on political polarization. I explain
the theory in section 3 and create two testable hypotheses. The methodology and data are
described in section 4. I present the results of the models in section 5. Finally, I discuss the
results and conclude in section 6.
2 LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Selectorate Theory
Selectorate theory is a rational choice model that explains and predicts policy choices
in broad terms. Although institutionally-minded, it uses the incentive of political leaders,
or politicians, as a base. All politicians want to get power and keep power, a standard
assumption in rational choice models of politics (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman 1994;
Mayhew 1974; Mintz 2004). Even civic-minded politicians have this incentive because they
require power to implement their policies. If possible, leaders will shift political institutions to
make survival easier and increase the discretionary resources that they can use for purposes
like public projects or corruption. Regardless of the precise motivation, politicians view
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their decisions through the prospect of survival (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, 15–23).
Selections institutions, the political institutions that choose leaders, structure politicians’
incentives. These institutions exist in three nested groups. Anybody living in the polity is
in the residents. Residents with a formal, government-sanctioned role in leadership selection
who can potentially join the winning coalition are in the selectorate. The disenfranchised
are residents not in the selectorate. Legal suffrage is sufficient for selectorate membership in
democracies. The selectorate forms a pool of possible supporters when election time comes.
The winning coalition has sufficient political power to keep the leader in office or elevate a
challenger (37–57). The size of the winning coalition can vary substantially, especially in
non-democratic regimes. For democracies, the winning coalitions are approximately one-
fourth to one-half of the residents, or total population, for parliamentary and presidential
systems, respectively (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010).
The policy implications of selectorate theory come from the size of the winning coalition
and relationship between the winning coalition and selectorate. Politicians attract support
through proposed tax rates and government-provided private goods and public goods. Only
members of the winning coalition will derive utility from private goods, but the benefits
of public goods go to all residents. When the winning coalition includes a relatively small
number of residents, government spending will prioritize private goods as the most efficient
means of attracting support. Larger winning coalitions will cause a focus on public goods
because the cost of private goods increases linearly with the winning coalition and becomes
too expensive. The loyalty norm, or the probability of inclusion in future winning coalitions,
determines how much the regime spends. When the winning coalition and selectorate are
close in size, winning coalition members have less loyalty to the leader because they have a
high probability of inclusion in future coalitions. Therefore, the leader spends highly to retain
their support. Winning coalition membership is rare and precious when the winning coalition
is much smaller than the selectorate, so the leader can spend less (Bueno de Mesquita et
al. 2003, chap. 3).
5
Figure 3: Bueno de Mesquita et al.’s (2003) Explanation for Why Wealthy Democracies
Survive
Utility of W
Size of W
Utility Threshold
Source: Adapted from Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003, 390, fig. 8.2).
These policy implications drive the institutional arrangements that different groups in
society want. Leaders want small winning coalitions and, if possible, large selectorates to
maximize their time in office and minimize spending. The disenfranchised want a large win-
ning coalition and a large selectorate because they still receive the benefit of high-spending
on public goods (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009; 2017; 2018) The winning coalition has
a more dynamic interest. Figure 3 models how the utility of the winning coalition shifts over
different winning coalition sizes. Below the dotted line, or the wealth threshold, the winning
coalition could increase its welfare by either expanding or contracting. Once the threshold
is crossed, the decreases in size can no longer benefit the winning coalition because winning
coalitions that large require extremely high levels of spending. Therefore, any attempt by
the leader to decrease the size of a winning coalition that has crossed the wealth thresh-
old should result in the leader losing the winning coalition’s support (Bueno de Mesquita
et al. 2003, 388–92).
2.2 Polarization
Polarization refers to situations in which something splits into two extreme groups. For
a more formal definition, polarization focuses on three axioms: one, there is strong within-
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group homogeneity; two, there is strong inter-group heterogeneity; and three, there are a
few groups of substantial size, ideally two (Esteban and Ray 1994). Political science and
related fields have long considered polarization in a political context, but the meaning of po-
litical polarization has varied. Much of this literature emerges from American politics where
polarization has emerged into a near consensus. However, while debate on the existence of
polarization is light, there remains substantial disagreement on whether polarization is an
elite or mass phenomenon and the precise meaning of polarization. I will begin by discussing
polarization in the American politics literature and then move to comparative literature.
Perhaps the most agreed upon finding in the American literature is the existence of
ideological polarization at an elite level. Elite polarization emerges when elected members
of parties have extremely similar ideologies with little overlap between members of separate
parties. This fact is seemingly uncontested by the overwhelmingly majority of academics. In
the modern Congress, it is extremely rare to see a single Democrat more conservative than
a single Republican or a single Republican more liberal than a single Democrat (Barber and
McCarty 2015). The debate is more focused on what causes elite polarization. For example,
many scholars focus on structural factors originating from how parties are organized and
how it encourages partisan competition (Edwards 2012; Lees 2016; Mann and Ornstein 2012;
Sinclair 2006), including institutions at a local level (Masket 2011). Others have focused on
mass polarization.
Mass polarization refers to a similar situation to elite polarization except it happens
among voters and the general population. Agreement on mass polarization is more con-
tentious than elite polarization. Most agree that Americans are more consistently Demo-
cratic or Republican and that these partisan identities strongly align with ideologies or at
least ideological identities. Nearly all self-identified liberals are Democrats, and nearly all
self-identified conservatives are Republicans (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Levendusky
2009). Academics have disagreed on the meaning of this alignment. Some claim that par-
tisan sorting reflects genuine diverging of ideological preferences among American voters
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(Abramowitz and Saunders 2006; 2008). Others argue that voters’ ideologies have remained
relatively stable, but voters have better sorted themselves into parties fitting their ideolo-
gies (Fiorina 2017). On the other hand, the relationship can be more complex. Voters rely
on parties to identify policy positions, so extreme elite opinions can bleed into the general
population. The resulting diverging of ideologies can fuel further polarization (Baldassarri
and Gelman 2008; Rogowski and Sutherland 2016).
Political identity has been an enduring trait of voting in studying American politics. Most
studies find that voters do not have strongly developed ideologies and policy positions, nor do
they hold these views consistently. Instead, voters latch on to salient identities as heuristics,
the famed “mental shortcuts” (see Gilovich and Griffin 2002), to make political decisions
and develop some policy opinions. While social or demographic identities influence these
processes, the most powerful is simple partisanship (Bartels 2000; Campbell et al. [1960]
1980; Converse [1964] 2006; Lewis-Beck et al. 2008). Polarization seems to be partially
driven by the alignment of multiple identities together. For example, the polarization of
American politics has followed the connection of racial identities into political parties, namely
white Americans into the Republican party and non-white Americans into the Democratic
party (Abramowitz and McCoy 2019; Abramowitz 2018; Carothers 2019). American politics
has increasingly polarized along identities to a greater extent than ideology (Mason 2018).
Partisan, religious, racial, and gender identities increasingly go along with each other, and
the effect of having aligned identities is multiplicative, not additive (Huddy, Mason, and
Horwitz 2016). For example, Republicans who are white, Christian, and male have much
stronger ties to being Republican than, say, Republicans who are female or not white (Mason
and Wronski 2018).
Polarization as the aligning of identities has proven influential in comparative politics
with the theory of pernicious polarization (McCoy, Rahman, and Somer 2018; hereafter
MRS 2018). Pernicious polarization begins in social identity theory. People identify with
groups and form their identities and concepts of the self around the groups that they identity
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with. This leads to people liking members of their own group and disliking people not in
the group, otherwise known as the outgroup (Tajfel and Turner 1979; 1986). This is referred
to as affective polarization. Pernicious polarization begins with underlying cleavages that
present the potential to engender polarization (MRS 2018). Movements led by either elites
or masses weaponize negative discourse such as attacking political opponent’s integrity or
other personal features, heightening negative partisanship, or the dislike of the opposing
party, and affective polarization (Abramowitz and Webster 2016; Iyengar et al. 2019). This
genesis stage often overlaps the ideational approach to populism. Under this approach,
populism focuses on a good versus evil symbology; a “homogenous and virtuous” people;
and a corrupt elite working against the people (Hawkins and Kaltwasser 2019, 3; Müller
2016).
The second phase involves the consequences of group identity stemming from social iden-
tity theory. Group members like each other more strongly, which does not inherently lead to
dislike of other groups. However, it opens up the possibility of growing affectiveness along
with the intentional or unintentional ability by political elites to feed into these feelings
(MRS 2018). This can lead to further extremism as groups tend to polarize (Sunstein 2002).
The growth of political polarization changes behavior. Primarily, members of each group
increase social distance with the other group, meaning that they interact with each other
less frequently. Members perceive their groups as “we” and the other as “them,” locked in a
form of competition. Political competition becomes increasingly zero-sum—a win for “them”
becomes a loss for “us.” Such perceptions eliminate the possibility of political cooperation
and compromise (Carlin and Love 2018; MRS 2018; McCoy and Somer 2019; Somer and
McCoy 2018).
When this causal chain reaches its most extreme consequences, it can lead to democratic
erosion. Groups see other groups as existential threats to their rights, way of life, and even
existence. Therefore, they accept democratic erosion and attacks on liberalism as a means
of protecting themselves (MRS 2018). Case study work has applied pernicious polarization
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to occasions of democratic erosion several times in the past few years, including Hungary
(Vegetti 2019), Poland (Fomina 2019; Tworzecki 2019), Turkey (Aydin-Düzgit 2019; Somer
2019), and the US (Abramowitz and McCoy 2019; Carothers 2019).
3 THEORY
I argue that polarization can explain why selectorate theory has incorrectly predicted
that democratic erosion causes a leader to lose power. To summarize the argument, large
winning coalitions are inherently electoral democracies. Liberal democracy emerges from
electoral democracy. While liberal components of democracy are usually the first to erode,
like independence of the judiciary or freedom of the press, this presages attacks on electoral
democracy and attempts to manipulate elections. The winning coalition, in the absence of
polarization, would stop supporting the leader when they attempt to undo electoral democ-
racy. However, polarization leads them to continue supporting the leader out of obedience to
their partisan and social identities or out of unwillingness to allow the other group to come
to power. Polarization thus lifts the constraint of democratic norms on leaders and allows
leaders to change institutions in their favor.
Conceptions of democracy are often split into electoral democracy and liberal democ-
racy, otherwise known as the “minimal” and “maximal” conceptions, respectively. Minimal
theorists, like Popper (1945) and Schumpeter (1942), define democracy solely through the
existence of competitive elections that can lead to a change in government. Maximal con-
ceptions, associated with Dahl (1956; 1971; 1984; 1989; 2015) and his idea of polyarchy,
argue that democracy also requires substantive rights like freedom of expression, freedom of
assembly, and political equality (Przeworski 1999; Teorell et al. 2019). Selectorate theory’s
concept of the large winning coalition is electoral democracy, which better fits the minimal
definition. A large winning coalition requires that somewhere around 25% of the population
is included in the winning coalition (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010). At this point
in human history, only a system with a minimum of electoral democracy (since a liberal
10
democracy have already achieved the electoral components) has achieved that size.
Selectorate theory does not ignore liberal democracy, however. Electoral democracies,
which I will now use interchangeably with large winning coalitions, produce greater public
goods. Selectorate theory, like many political science theories, borrows the idea of public
goods from economics. Public goods have two qualities. One, they are non-excludable,
meaning that their enjoyment cannot be restricted to only those who have contributed to
the good. Two, they are non-rivalrous, meaning that one person’s usage of the good does
not prevent someone else from using it (Samuelson 1954; 1955). Classic examples in political
contexts include air quality and defense spending. You cannot restrict someone who has
not paid for air from breathing it, nor does one citizen being protected from foreign threats
prevent another citizen from doing the same.
Selectorate theory relies on an expansive definition of public goods. We might more accu-
rately say that a public good in selectorate theory is something provided by the government
that the regime cannot restrict only to supporters. Of course, this may take an economic
form. Leaders and parties who rely on working class voters may implement greater unem-
ployment benefits or welfare programs. Public goods can also take form of political rights.
In responding to claims that the winning coalition variable measures democracy (Clarke and
Stone 2008), Morrow et al. (2008) write that
The expansion of suffrage brought about a vast expansion in the sizes of win-
ning coalitions in established democracies. . . [but] Our theory treats features that
others see as necessary for democracy to function, such as a free press, as pub-
lic goods that are provided by leaders who answer to a large winning coalition
[i.e. electoral democracy], but not provided by those who answer to a small one
. . . [therefore, their task is] separating the effects of the size of the winning coali-
tion from the effects of other elements [i.e. the liberal components] of democracy.
(394; italics mine)
Liberal democracy, therefore, emerges as an outcome of electoral democracy in selectorate
11
theory.
Most instances of democratic erosion involve attacks on the liberal components, at least
initially (see also Bermeo 2016; Ginsburg and Huq 2018; Varol 2015). To cite a few examples,
PiS in Poland, led by party leader and former-prime minister Jaros law Kaczyński along
with president Andrzej Duda,1 initiated its attacks on Polish democracy through increasing
political control of the judiciary and pressuring media outlets (Pryzybylski 2018). In India,
campaigning, including by the prime minister Narendra Modi and the ruling Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP), frequently involves attacking the legitimacy of independent institutions
like banks, courts, and electoral commissions (Sahoo 2019). From a comparative perspective,
one of the most common signs of the would-be authoritarian is supporting restrictions on
civil liberties (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018).
Under the selectorate framework, all of these actions qualify as reductions in liberal
democracy but not electoral democracy. But I argue that while democratic backsliding often
begins with attacks on liberal democracy, the quality of electoral democracy is intertwined
with these attacks. Attacking liberal components rarely serves as its own end. These actions
serve the goal of making survival easier. Redrawing electoral districts and manipulating
electoral rules can give the party decisive advantages in most elections. Control over the
judiciary prevents legal challenges from interfering with these plans. A weak independent
press restricts information of the regime’s unpopular decisions from and, in tandem with the
curtailing of civil liberties like freedom of assembly, impedes the coordination of opposition
parties. Successfully rigging elections starts long before voters go to the polls. The classic
image of stuffing ballot boxes is the last resort (Cheeseman and Klaas 2018).
The winning coalition should serve as the bulwark against these tactics succeeding. When
a leader restricts civil and electoral rights, they are restricting the number of people who enjoy
those public goods. By decreasing the size of the winning coalition, the leader guarantees that
1. PiS has adopted a unique structure of its party governance. Although Kaczyński leads the party and
served as prime minister during its last stint in power (Kaczyński’s twin brother served as the president),
he decided not to take a formal government position out of fear that he is personally unpopular. Most agree
that Kaczyński runs the government behind the scenes (Pryzybylski 2018).
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the winning coalition’s utility decreases from its current state. Utility decreases both become
some members will be forced from the winning coalition, but those remaining in the winning
coalition will also receive less public goods. Here, identity enters the equation. People like
to belong to groups and then make decisions that fit within their groups’ expected behaviors
(Akerlof and Kranton 2010). Partisans are obviously expected to vote for members of their
party. Other identities may or may not have associated political expectations. Women might
enjoy voting for other women, for example, should they have the option. Supporters of the
association football team A.C. Milan might have supported Silvio Berlusconi’s campaigns for
prime minister since he owned the team during its glory days. Social identities can fluctuate
in the extent that they affect political decisions.
Polarization heightens the influence of identity in political life. Most people identify with
a party and strongly like their co-partisans in addition to strongly disliking members of
the other party. Further, several other identities align under partisan banners and intensify
in-group attachment and out-group hate. At times of low polarization, even partisans can
accept occasionally supporting members of another party. With high polarization, hatred of
the opposite party is too extreme. Even if one dislikes the nominee of their party, they cannot
bring themselves to vote for somebody else. For example, a Republican may dislike Donald
Trump’s rhetoric but finds Democrats far too unacceptable to vote for them. Empirical
evidence for this phenomenon is building (Graham and Svolik 2020; Svolik 2019).
Therefore, polarization lifts the winning coalition’s constraint on the leader. The leader
may attack liberal democracy with the goal of harming electoral democracy. The winning
coalition does not throw the leader out either because they are too attached to the party,
they dislike (or fear) the opposite party too much, or a mixture of both. Acting against
your identities causes such a loss in utility that you prefer a loss of utility from receiving less
public goods to voting for another party.
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3.1 Hypotheses
We can now phrase the theory into two hypotheses. The first hypothesis, which I call
the selectorate hypothesis, is
Hypothesis 1 Decreases in the utility from public goods increase the probability that a leader
(party) loses power.
This hypothesis expresses the expectations of selectorate theory that the winning coalition
will strike back against a leader who proposes a reduction in its size once the welfare threshold
has been passed. My expectation is that, to some extent, this hypothesis will not hold, espe-
cially at higher levels of polarization, because polarization allows leaders to attack electoral
democracy and avoid repercussion.
The second hypothesis amends hypothesis 1. This hypothesis states that:
Hypothesis 2 As polarization increases, the marginal effect of decreases in the utility from
public goods on the probability that a leader (party) loses power decreases.
By increasing the payoff that voters receive from voting for members of their tribes, or
heightening the penalties of voting for members of opposing identities, polarization allows
leaders to survive attacks on electoral democracy.
4 RESEARCH DESIGN
4.1 Methodology
The hypotheses are tested using survival analysis, also known as event history or duration
analysis (see Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). Specifically, I use a Cox proportional
hazards (Cox PH) competing risks framework. The model tests the probability that a leader
or party loses power at a given time. Competing risks refers to the fact that leaders or parties
can lose power due to multiple types of events. They can lose power through elections or
through other, non-electoral processes such as impeachments or resignations. The Cox PH
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calculates a different baseline hazard for each event. The baseline hazard is the expected
risk before accounting for independent variables, so it is comparable to a intercept in a
standard regression model or, perhaps more accurately, a random intercept model. The
variables modify this baseline hazard, so a positive coefficient indicates a greater risk than
expected and a negative coefficient less risk. For hypothesis 1, we expect to see the change
in electoral democracy variables that I define later increase the hazard for both elections
and non-elections in the absence of polarization. When polarization increases, the marginal
effect of the change in electoral democracy variables will decrease according to hypothesis 2.
4.2 Data
4.2.1 Scope
Observations must meet four conditions to be included in the sample. These conditions
are:
1. Its country-year V-Dem entry has a coded political polarization value;
2. The country qualifies as an electoral democracy;
3. The country qualifies as wealthy; and
4. Selectorate theory applies to the country’s executive structure.
The first condition is purely practical. I have only one variable used to measure political
polarization, and polarization is integral to the analysis. Therefore, I require that V-Dem
has coded political polarization for at least one year in the term. Conditions two and three
serve theoretical purposes.
Hypothesis 1, and by extension hypothesis 2, applies only to electoral democracies. The
theory section details my argument for equating selectorate theory’s conception of a large
winning coalition with electoral democracy. To briefly reiterate this argument, a large win-
ning coalition requires that leader depends on a relatively large segment of the residents, or
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total population, to maintain power. This cutoff appears to be around 25% of the popula-
tion. Only electoral democracy achieves this goal. Conceptions of democracy that require
more than simply competitive elections, called liberal democracy, are outcomes of electoral
democracy. Refer to section 3 for further detail. In short, I am relying on the minimal
definition of democracy.
Now, we need to turn this definition into a measurable variable. The Regimes of the
World (RoW) typology uses V-Dem data to create categories from continuous measures.
While they separate electoral and liberal democracies, they still rely on the polyarchy index
(Lührmann, Tannenberg, and Lindberg 2018), which uses a more maximal than minimal
definition. Instead, I use the Democracy-Dictatorship (DD) rules. This system categorizes
countries into democracies and non-democracies based on a minimal definition. Democracies,
in this ruleset, must meet four conditions:
1. A chief executive either popularly elected or chosen by a popularly-elected body;
2. A popularly-elected legislature;
3. Multi-party electoral competition; and
4. Alternation in power under the same electoral rules that brought the incumbent into
power (Alvarez et al. 1996; Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010).
The fourth condition essentially serves as evidence of a genuine democracy. However, it
creates ambiguity when a party has not lost an election under otherwise genuinely democratic
rules. Most ambiguous cases are moot because they do not meet the wealth requirement.
Of ambiguous cases meeting the wealth requirement, I include both Botswana and South
Africa after they cross the wealth threshold I include Mexico starting in 1994 rather than
2000. I use Bjørnskov and Rode’s (2020) dataset because theirs is the most updated, being
coded through 2019.2 The dataset starts at 1950, so it does exclude a few years that might
2. Bjørnskov and Rode’s (2020) data are accessible at http://www.christianbjoernskov.com/
bjoernskovrodedata/.
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have met the requirements earlier.
The third condition is the utility threshold, or the point when the winning coalition re-
ceives more benefits being large than it could being small. Wealth is used to approximate the
utility threshold. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) estimate this figure at a gross domestic
product (GDP) per capita of $6,055 in 1985 dollars based on Przeworski et al. (2000) and
Przeworski and Limongi (1997). Those studies find that within their decades-long sample,
no country coded as a democracy according to the DD rules with a GDP per capita above
that threshold reverted to authoritarianism. However, they find a lower threshold of $4,000
in 1985 dollars that nearly guarantees survival. Given the randomness of the social world,
guaranteed and near guaranteed—or sufficient and nearly sufficient—have little practical dif-
ference (Clark, Gilligan, and Golder 2006; Ragin 2008). Therefore, I use the lower threshold.
I retrieve the GDP per capita data from the Maddison Project (Bolt et al. 2018).3 Some
countries meet the wealth requirement and then briefly dip under the threshold. For these
countries, I keep them in the sample continuously if they return to the wealth requirement
within five years (although any drop from the democracy requirement leaves the sample).
The final condition is specific to selectorate theory. Selectorate theory assumes that
countries can be reasonably reduced to one leader. The vast majority of cases meet this
condition. Even in mixed systems where a separate head of government and head of state
each have some level of power, we can reduce them to one chief executive. The rare cases have
plural executives. This eliminates Switzerland in addition to Bosnia and Herezogvina. Each
has an executive council. While the councils have a rotating presidency and chairmanship,
respectively, these offices are primarily ceremonial (Church 2004; D. J. Smith 2020, 218–20).
Lebanon, to ease religious tension, vests executive powers in three different offices, the prime
minister, president, and speaker of parliament (Salamey 2014), so I exclude Lebanon too.
3. The Maddison Project data are accessible from https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/historicaldevelopment/
maddison/releases/maddison-project-database-2018.
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Table 1: Countries and Years in Sample
Country Start End
Albania 2005 2019
Argentina 1946 1955
Argentina 1958 1966
Argentina 1973 1976
Argentina 1984 2019
Armenia 2008 2019
Austria 1959 2019
Barbados 1967 2019
Belgium 1954 2019
Botswana 1998 2019
Brazil 1995 2019
Bulgaria 1991 2019
Canada 1945 2019
Chile 1990 2019
Colombia 2006 2019
Croatia 1990 2019
Czech Republic 1992 2019
Denmark 1948 2019
Dominican Republic 2004 2019
Ecuador 2007 2019
Estonia 1991 2019
Finland 1978 2019
France 2007 2019
Georgia 2008 2019
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Table 1 continued from previous page
Country Start End
Germany 1953 2019
Hungary 1990 2019
Iceland 2018 2019
Indonesia 2009 2019
Ireland 1967 2019
Israel 1963 2019
Italy 1960 2019
Japan 1964 2019
Latvia 1990 2019
Lithuania 1990 2019
Malaysia 2008 2019
Malta 1976 2019
Mauritius 1983 2017
Mexico 1995 2019
Mongolia 2009 2019
Netherlands 1952 2019
New Zealand 2005 2019
Norway 1949 2019
Panama 1994 2019
Paraguay 2013 2019
Peru 2006 2019
Poland 1991 2019
Portugal 1986 2019
Romania 2001 2019
Serbia 2006 2019
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Table 1 continued from previous page
Country Start End
Slovakia 1992 2019
Slovenia 1990 2019
South Africa 1999 2019
South Korea 1988 2019
Spain 1976 2019
Sri Lanka 2010 2019
Sweden 1948 2019
Taiwan 2000 2019
Thailand 2005 2006
Thailand 2008 2014
Trinidad and Tobago 1963 2019
Tunisia 2012 2019
Turkey 1984 2015
Ukraine 2005 2019
United Kingdom 1945 2019
Uruguay 1985 2019
Venezuela 1974 2019
Table 1 presents every country in the sample with the first and last year that they are in
the sample. For countries that leave and reenter the sample, I split them into several rows.
The sample includes 62 countries spanning 2040 years. I start including a country in term
with the year that it first meets all four scope conditions, hence some countries begin before
1950. Broken down into terms, there are 526 leader tenures broken into 751 terms. There
are 341 party tenures across 606 terms.4 I clarify terms and tenures in the next section.
4. Note that the US is excluded because V-Dem does not include polarization values for it.
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4.2.2 Dependent Variable
The dependent variable is tied to the analysis strategy. For each term, the dependent
variable is whether the leader or party loses power due to an election or a non-electoral event.
A term refers to a period between elections in which one unit of observation holds power. For
example, United Kingdom (UK) prime minister David Cameron came to power in 2010 after
the Conservatives won the 2010 parliamentary elections, beginning his first term. He and the
Conservatives won another term in power after winning the 2015 parliamentary elections.
He resigned in 2016, and Theresa May began her first term in power after the Conservatives
chose her as Cameron’s successor. She won an election in 2017, marking her second term.
Boris Johnson succeed May in 2019 after she resigned and began a second term also in 2019
following an election. From 2010 to 2019, the UK had three leaders across six leader terms.
Four party terms occurred in the same time span. The first began after the Conservatives
won the 2010 elections and the second when they won the 2015 elections. When Cameron
resigned, the Conservatives remained in power with May, so a third term did not start until
they won the 2017 elections. The Conservatives continued in power after Johnson succeeded
May. A fourth term started after they won the 2019 elections.
Figure 4 presents the distribution of terms for both leaders and parties. Note that
the count begins when the leader or power enters power, not when they enter the sample.
The first term in a country, therefore, might be after one. For example, the Institutional
Revolutionary Party (PRI) in Mexico controlled the presidency for 13 terms between 1929
and 2000. This final term is when Mexico (1994–2000) enters the term. Some parties can
survive in office for much longer than any leader can, but overall, the distributions appear
relatively similar.
I split the types of events that remove leaders and parties from power into elections and
non-elections. Elections are self-explanatory. Either the leader loses a direct popular election
or cannot form a coalition in the legislature. For parties, either the party’s candidate loses a
direct election, or the party cannot form a coalition that keeps one of its members in power.
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Figure 4: Distribution of Terms
Non-elections include essentially everything else: impeachments, votes of no confidence,
losses of cabinet support, resignations, retirements, and even coups on rare occasions. A
few events are coded as being censored, meaning that the observation is treated as having
survived past that term for an unknown period of time. When a leader cannot continue in
office from legal term limits, they never truly lost power as a consequence of their actions.
The same applies for deaths and assassinations.5 Resignations and retirements spurred
by health problems count as a non-election event, but leaders removed from office due to
incapacitation—like prime ministers Keizō Obuchi of Japan and Ariel Sharon of Israel—are
censored. Parties lose power through non-election events if the leader’s replacement is not of
the same party and not chosen through an election. Of the 751 leader terms, 142 (18.91%)
lost power through an election and 260 (34.62%) through another event. An event was
not experienced in 349 (46.47%) terms. Of the 606 party terms, 190 (31.35%) ended in an
election loss and another 98 (16.17%) through another event. An event was not experienced
5. Only two leaders in the sample were assassinated, prime ministers Olof Palme of Sweden and Yitzhak
Rabin of Israel.
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in 318 (52.48%) terms.
I collected data on leader terms using the Archigos (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza
2009) and Rules, Elections, and Irregular Governance (REIGN; Bell 2016) datasets.6 The
year that I code a term starting depends on when the leader or party took power. If the leader
or party took power in their first term after September, I code the term as beginning the
following year unless the term ends in the same year. Otherwise, I code the term beginning
that year. The leader or party’s term always ends with the year that they left office except
when transitions last several months. I code the parties as the incumbent’s primary party
affiliation. Most independent leaders will not have a party unless a party strongly supports
their candidacy. This is particularly the case in countries like Poland where presidents are
nominally independent but usually lead a party. Independents in parliamentary systems
nominated by a coalition, such as the Olive Tree in Italy, are coded as having the coalition
as their party. Presidential systems and presidents in mixed systems cannot have coalitions
as parties because the nature of these offices is zero-sum.
Survival curves provide an overview of how risk, independent of covariates, change over
time. Figure 5 presents survival curves for leaders and parties using the Aalen-Johansen
estimator (see Aalen and Johansen 1978).7 The y-axis displays the probability that an event
is experienced in that term conditional on having survived to that term. Leaders and parties
actually have similar survival curves except leaders are more susceptible to non-elections but
parties to elections, and parties can survive to longer times.
4.2.3 Independent Variables
The hypotheses establish two primary independent variables of interest: polarization and
change in electoral democracy or change in the winning coalition size. Version 10 of V-Dem
6. The Archigos data are accessible from https://www.rochester.edu/college/faculty/hgoemans/data.htm.
REIGN is updated monthly. I referred to version release in April 2020, but any of the 2020 versions have the
required data. The most recent version is accessible from https://oefdatascience.github.io/REIGN.github.
io/menu/reign current.html.
7. Survival curves are usually presented with the Kaplan-Meier curve (see Kaplan and Meier 1958). How-
ever, Kaplan-Meier curves are inappropriate for competing risks data.
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Figure 5: Survival Curves for Leaders and Parties by Term
provides a polarization measure with the most coverage across place and time currently
available (Coppedge et al. 2020a).8 This refers to the variable titled “political polarization”
and labeled v2cacamps in the dataset rather than the related variable “polarization of society”
(v2smpolsoc). The question asks country experts “Is society polarized into antagonistic,
political camps?” and further clarified as “the extent to which polarized differences affect
social relationships beyond political discussions. Societies are highly polarized if supports
of opposing political camps are reluctant to engage in friendly interactions, for example, in
family functions, civic associations, their free time activities and workplaces.” Respondents
have the options of
• Zero for “Not at all. . . Supporters of opposing political camps generally interact in a
friendly manner”;
• One for “Mainly not. . . Supporters of opposing political camps are more likely to in-
teract in a friendly than a hostile manner”;
8. V-Dem version 10 is accessible from https://www.v-dem.net/en/data/data-version-10/.
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• Two for “Somewhat. . . Supporters of opposing political camps are equally likely to
interact in a friendly or hostile manner”;
• Three for “Yes, to [a] noticeable extent. . . Supporters of opposing political camps are
more likely to interact in a hostile than friendly manner”; and
• Four for “Yes, to a large extent. . . Supporters of opposing political camps generally
interact in a hostile manner” (Coppedge et al. 2020b, 211).
These ordinal responses are converted to an interval measurement through Bayesian item
response theory (IRT; see Marquardt and Pemstein 2018; Pemstein et al. 2020). The interval
scale is then converted to an interval measurement on the original scale between zero and
four (which is labeled v2cacamps osp). I take the average polarization value during a term.
If the term includes years without a value, I exclude those years from the calculation. Table
2 includes summary statistics for this and other continuous variables.
The electoral democracy variable is more complex. I use variables that result from
changes in the winning coalition size. The most sensible option is corruption. Smaller win-
ning coalitions allow for greater corruption (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Chang and
Golden 2010). Further, scholars recognize corruption as a clear aspect of democratic ero-
sion. I measure corruption with McMann et al.’s (2016) variable built from V-Dem data.
It averages the “executive bribery and corruption exchanges” (v2exbribe) and “executive
embezzlement and theft” variables (v2exembez ; Coppedge et al. 2020b, 110–11). Then, it
reverses the scale so that higher values indicate greater corruption. I multiple the index by
100 so that it takes values of zero to 100. I take this value at the last year of the term and
subtract the value at the start of the term to measure the change in corruption. If a term
takes place within a single year, I take the change from the previous year. For example,
Brazilian president Jair Bolsnaro has only been in office during 2019 for purposes of the
sample. I measure the change since 2018 in his case. The other two democracy variables are
calculated in the same way.
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Table 2: Summary Statistics for Continuous Variables
Variable N Mean Min. Q1 Median Q3 Max.
Leaders
Polarization 741 1.59 0.124 0.867 1.35 2.32 3.92
Change in Corruption 749 -0.893 -46 0.00 0.00 0.00 44.1
Change in Private Goods 749 -0.559 -40.4 0.00 0.00 0.00 34.7
Change in Gini Coefficient 559 0.0438 -4.9 -0.3 0.1 0.4 5.5
Resource Wealth 500 2.39 0.00 0.198 0.7057 1.81 38.9
GDP Growth 699 0.03064 -0.369 0.011 0.0288 0.0465 2.87
Inflation 587 17.97 -1.2 2.48 4.69 8.91 823.8
Logged GDP per Capita 688 4.254 3.859 4.074 4.246 4.42 4.887
Logged Land Area 751 5.139 2.47 4.661 5.046 5.57 6.997
Logged Population 414 4.049 2.377 3.615 3.99 4.708 5.243
Coordination Goods 751 0.863 0.115 0.862 0.887 0.9065 0.953
Term Length in Years 751 2.385 0.00 1.00 2.00 4.00 6.00
Shape 751 11.03 0.00 10.00 12.00 13.00 13.5
Parties
Polarization 597 1.593 0.124 0.867 1.368 2.32 3.918
Change in Corruption 604 -0.924 -49.7 -0.125 0.00 0.00 44.1
Change in Private Goods 604 -0.47 -40.4 -0.0254 0.00 0.00 34.7
Change in Gini Coefficient 440 0.0377 -4.9 -0.4 0.1 0.5 5.5
Resource Wealth 404 2.526 0.00 0.222 0.722 1.902 37.3
GDP Growth 567 0.0323 -0.396 0.0129 0.0284 0.0464 2.87
Inflation 469 19.2 -1.002 2.58 4.701 8.93 823.8
Logged GDP per Capita 558 4.25 3.86 4.073 4.25 4.42 4.89
Logged Land Area 606 5.12 2.47 4.63 5.028 5.57 7.00
Logged Population 355 4.005 2.37 3.603 3.96 4.59 5.24
Coordination Goods 606 0.865 0.115 0.8601 0.887 0.907 0.953
Term Length in Years 606 2.98 0.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 6.00
Note: The maximum N for leader variables is 751 and 606 for parties.
The second variable is private goods. A core prediction of selectorate theory is that
smaller winning coalitions will receive less public goods (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). I
base the private goods variable on the “particularistic or public goods” variable (v2dlencmps)
from V-Dem. The question asks “Considering the profile of social and infrastructural spend-
ing in the national budget, how ‘particularistic’ or ‘public goods’ are most expenditures”?
They add the clarification that “Particularistic spending is narrowly targeted on a specific
corporation sector, social group, region, party, or set of constituents. Such spending may be
referred to as ‘pork,’ ‘clientelistic,’ or ‘private goods.’ Public-goods spending is intended to
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benefit all communities within a society, though it may be means-tested so as to target poor,
needy, or otherwise underprivileged constituents. . . We are interested in the relative value of
particularistic and public-goods spending, not the number of bills or programs that fall into
either category.” Possible answers are:
• Zero for “Almost all of the social and infrastructure expenditures are particularistic”;
• One for “Most social and infrastructure expenditures are particularistic, but a signifi-
cant portion (e.g. 1/4 or 1/3) is public-goods”;
• Two for “Social and infrastructure expenditures are evenly divided between particu-
laristic and public-goods programs”;
• three for “Most social and infrastructure expenditures are public-goods but a significant
portion (e.g. 1/4 or 1/3) is particularistic”; and
• Four for “Almost all social and infrastructure expenditures are public-goods in char-
acter. . . Only a small amount is particularistic” (Coppedge et al. 2020b, 151–52).
I take the version converted to an interval scale by Bayesian IRT and reverse the scale, so
higher values indicate a greater focus on private goods, and I also rescale it to range from
zero to 100. Then, I calculate the change over the term.
The last democracy measurement is income inequality. Smaller winning coalitions gener-
ally have greater income inequality (Kemp-Benedict 2011). I retrieve the Gini coefficient, a
common measurement for income inequality, from the Standardized World Income Inequal-
ity Database (SWIID; Solt 2020).9 As a percent, the Gini coefficient already ranges from
zero to 100 with income inequality as the higher values, so I only calculate the change over
the course of the term.
9. The SWIID data are accessible from https://fsolt.org/swiid/.
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Figure 6: Survival Curves for Leaders by Gender
Sources: Leader gender from Archigos (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009) and REIGN (Bell 2016).
Note: Survival curves calculated using the Aalen-Johansen estimator (see Aalen and Johansen 1978).
4.2.4 Controls
I also include several control variables in the models. For leaders, I account for the
incumbency advantage. Selectorate theory predicts that leaders have an advantage over
challengers because supporters know their position with the leader while their standing
with the challenger is unknown (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). This motivates the use of
Weibull survival models, which are parametric and have the research set the baseline hazard.
I account for the incumbency advantage by including a variable called “shape.” Yearly data
indicates that leaders of wealthy democracies become more likely to survive around years
12 to 15 depending on the type of risk. I calculate the shape parameter as the absolute
difference between the number of years since the leader entered office and 13.5 (12+152 ).
I also include the gender of leaders. This variable is a simple dummy variable with
values for male and female. No leader in the sample identifies with another gender identity,
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and all have identified as cisgender. I do not have specific expectations for how gender
affects survival, but it seems reasonable that voters might treat or perceive women leaders
differently from their male counterparts. Only 51 (7%) terms have a female leader. Figure
6 presents survival curves separated by leader gender. The descriptive evidence does not
suggest a discernible difference, and women appear to have an initial advantage in survival,
but it evens out.
The status of leaders is also included. Acting leaders, including prime ministers of care-
taker governments and interim presidents, rarely run for reelection. Therefore, being an
acting leader almost guarantees that they will not lose power through an election but will
lose power by other means. Of the 751 terms, only 30 (4%) have an acting leader. Most
leaders in presidential systems and many in mixed systems have term limits that prevent
them from running for office. Term limits almost assure in the sense that I code leaving office
due to term limits as a form of censoring. They cannot lose elections and are less likely to
be removed through other means as people know that they will be leaving office soon. Since
they cannot run for reelection, this variable is included as a coefficient only for non-electoral
risks. Each is a dummy variable. Of the 751 terms, 30 (4%) have an acting leader and 69
(9%) a term-limited leader.
The type of democracy likely effects survival. Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (CGV 2010)
split democratic regimes into parliamentary, mixed, and presidential. I retrieve this data
from Bjørnskov and Rode (2020). The mixed coding generally refers to semi-presidential
systems but can also include chief executives who are prime ministers. Figure 7 provides
some descriptive evidence for possible relationships through leader survival curves separated
by the political system. The parliamentary and mixed curves do not differ substantially
from each other, but presidents are far more likely to survive and much less susceptible to
losing elections. This is unsurprising given my coding of term-limited leaders, especially
since many countries do not allow consecutive terms. For leader terms, 425 (56%) are par-
liamentary systems, 188 (25%) mixed, and 83 (11%) presidential. There are 55 (7%) terms
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Figure 7: Survival Curves for Leaders by Regime Type
Source: Regime type from Bjørnskov and Rode’s (2020) coding of DD (Alvarez et al. 1996; Cheibub, Gandhi,
and Vreeland 2010).
Note: Survival curves calculated using the Aalen-Johansen estimator (see Aalen and Johansen 1978).
with missing data. For party terms, 337 (56%) are parliamentary, 148 (24%) mixed, and 77
(13%) presidents. Data are missing in 44 (7%) terms.
Finally, I includes several other variables that plausibly affect political survival. Most of
these variables consider economic factors: GDP growth, logged GDP per capita, resource
wealth per capita as a percentage of GDP per capita, and inflation. 10 Larger land area
and populations complicate the provision of goods, so I included them logged. Civil liberties
like the rights of association and assembly, or “coordination goods,” are key to punishing
leaders (Bueno de Mesquita and Downs 2005; A. Smith 2008). I use the V-Dem freedom of
association index to represent coordination goods. Lastly, there is length of term in years.
All variables are averaged over the term.
10. All logs refer to the common log of base ten.
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4.2.5 Missing Data
Several observations have missing data. The number can determined by referring to table
2 and subtracting the N for each variable from the maximum number or the number of term-
observations—751 for leaders and 606 for parties. No data are missing for the dependent
variable, and only a few observations have missing data for the independent variables of
interest. Rather than exclude these observations through listwise deletion, I use the form of
multiple imputation (MI) implemented by the Amelia package for R (for technical details,
see Blackwell, Honaker, and King 2017a; 2017b).11 Each analysis is the result of 25 imputed
datasets (M = 25). I impute 25 datasets for each model. The imputation takes into account
every variable in the model, each electoral democracy variable, and the interaction term
included in the model. Each dataset is analyzed individually and then combined through
Rubin’s (1987) rules (see also Buuren 2018; Enders 2010; Marshall et al. 2009).
5 RESULTS
Table 3 presents the results of the model testing the effects of corruption on leader sur-
vival. Negative coefficients indicate that the risk has decreased (higher survival probability);
positive coefficients indicate greater risk (lower survival probability). The substantive effect
is estimated for a given variable is
100(eβ − 1), (1)
where β is the coefficient estimate (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 60).12 This model
provides some support for both hypotheses. When polarization is zero, a one point increase
in corruption increases the probability of losing power through an election by 15.53%. How-
ever, it decreases the probability of losing through another event by 10.44%. This supports
11. The Amelia package is accessible through https://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/Amelia/index.html.
12. Technically, the full equation is eβ(xi=X1)−eβ(xi=X2)
eβ(xi=X2)
∗ 100, where X1 and X2 represent two coefficient
estimates of the same variable using two different estimation methods. When only one estimation is used,
the second values default to zero, and e0 = 1.
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Figure 8: Marginal Effect Plots for Significant Interaction Terms
(a) Marginal Effect of Change in Cor-
ruption on Leader Losing Election
(b) Marginal Effect of Change in Cor-
ruption on Leader Non-Election Event
(c) Marginal Effect of Change in Cor-
ruption on Party Non-Election Event
(d) Marginal Effect of Change in Goods
on Party Non-Election Event
Notes: Error bars represent 90% confidence intervals in subfigure a and 95% confidence intervals in subfigures
b, c, and d.
hypothesis 1 in the context of elections but contradicts it otherwise.
Analysis of the second hypothesis requires looking at the marginal effect over different
values of polarization. I focus on the integer values that expert respondents can give before
conversion to the interval scale. Figure 8a presents change in corruption’s marginal effect on
the probability of a leader losing power through an election. Polarization very quickly erodes
the effect of corruption. The effect loses significance by value one and remains insignificant.
This broadly fits with the pattern expected by hypothesis 2 but undermines the selectorate
hypothesis since polarization nullifies the effect so quickly. Figure 8b displays the opposite
relationship regarding non-election events.
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Table 3: Model Summary for Corruption and Leader Survival
Elections Other
Variable Est. p Est. p
Polarization 0.0763 0.51 0.122 0.17
(0.116) (0.0888)
Change in Corruption 0.144 0.06 -0.11 0.01
(0.0756) (0.0426)
Polarization*Change in Corruption -0.0527 0.05 0.0375 0.01
(0.516) (0.0153)
Resource Wealth 0.00305 0.87 -0.0157 0.46
(0.0189) (0.021)
Acting -1.81 0.08 1.15 p < 0.001
(1.05) (0.19)
Term-Limited -1.24 0.009
(0.475)
Female -0.356 0.38 -0.0798 0.74
(0.406) (0.244)
GDP Growth -1.16 0.44 -1.48 0.22
(1.52) (1.19)
Inflation -0.000752 0.71 0.000429 0.63
(0.00202) (0.0009)
Logged GDP per Capita 0.723 0.16 -0.333 0.36
(0.516) (0.362)
Logged Land Area 0.166 0.29 0.0123 0.93
(0.154) (0.137)
Logged Population -0.844 0.004 0.448 0.03
(0.286) (0.205)
Coordination Goods 1.32 0.38 -0.0107 0.99
(1.52) (0.777)
Term Length in Years 0.0692 0.34 -0.299 p < 0.001
(0.0725) (0.0558)
Mixed System -0.135 0.57 0.00347 0.98
(0.238) (0.167)
Presidential System -1.74 0.004 -0.167 0.62
(0.594) (0.342)
Shape -0.0127 0.84 0.164 0.002
(0.0627) (0.0526)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 4: Model Summary for Corruption and Party Survival
Elections Other
Variable Est. p Est. p
Polarization 0.0758 0.42 0.0461 0.75
(0.094) (0.14)
Change in Corruption 0.0315 0.58 -0.218 p < 0.001
(0.057) (0.056)
Polarization*Change in Corruption -0.00573 0.77 0.072 p < 0.001
(0.02) (0.02)
Resource Wealth 0.0115 0.44 -0.00633 0.83
(0.015) (0.03)
GDP Growth -2.72 0.08 -0.389 0.69
(1.5) (0.96)
Inflation -0.000837 0.56 0.00104 0.47
(0.0014) (0.0014)
Logged GDP per Capita 0.335 0.39 -0.316 0.58
(0.39) (0.57)
Logged Land Area 0.0853 0.5 0.216 0.25
(0.13) (0.19)
Logged Population -0.354 0.1 -0.232 0.48
(0.21) (0.33)
Coordination Goods 2.71 0.08 -1.23 0.18
(1.5) (0.92)
Term Length in Years 0.19 0.001 -0.44 p < 0.001
(0.06) (0.08)
Mixed System 0.00947 0.96 -0.0891 0.76
(0.2) (0.29)
Presidential System -0.132 0.64 0.211 0.61
(0.28) (0.41)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 4 turns to the analysis of corruption regarding party survival. Change in corrup-
tion does not have a significant effect on the probability of losing elections but does for
other events. Like the leader model, a one point increase in corruption lowers the hazard,
specifically by 3.2%. The marginal effects in figure 8c shows a similar relationship to figure
8b. At lower levels of polarization, increasing corruption decreases the risk, but this effect
grows weaker as polarization increases, eventually becoming insignificant.
The private goods variable shows similar relationships. According to table 7, increases
in private goods do not have a significant effect on the risk of election events but decrease
the risk of other events by -4.03%. The interaction term does not have a significant effect,
so I do not include a marginal effects plot. The save space, the tables for models without
significant effects are shown in the appendix. Table 5 shows the effect on party survival.
Again, we see no significant effect regarding elections with a negative coefficient for other
events. A one point increase in private goods decreases the hazard by 8.66%. The marginal
effects in figure 8c shows the same relationship that we have seen in other interaction terms
regarding non-election events. Finally, we turn to income inequality. The variable does not
have an effect regardless of the unit of observation or the event type. Table 8 presents the
results for leaders and table 6 for parties.
6 DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION
The model testing the effect of changes in corruption on leader survival provided the most
support for my theory. Without polarization present, increases in corruption, which should
represent democratic erosion, increased the probability that a leader lost an election. The
introduction of polarization quickly nullifies this effect. Indeed, it disappears rather quickly.
Almost any amount of polarization causes the effect to become insignificant. Corruption was
expected to be the strongest variable since it captures both a direct process of democratic
erosion and outcome of decreasing winning coalition sizes. Further, it is likely the variable
most obvious to voters.
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Table 5: Model Summary for Private Goods and Party Survival
Elections Other
Variable Est. p Est. p
Polarization 0.071 0.45 -0.018 0.9
(0.095) (0.14)
Change in Private Goods 0.015 0.6 -0.091 0.002
(0.029) (0.029)
Polarization*Change in Private Goods -0.0075 0.56 0.037 0.001
(0.013) (0.011)
Resource Wealth 0.011 0.48 -0.0011 0.97
(0.015) (0.027)
GDP Growth -2.8 0.08 -0.51 0.53
(1.6) (0.81)
Inflation -0.00025 0.83 0.0004 0.78
(0.0012) (0.0014)
Logged GDP per Capita 0.38 0.33 -0.044 0.93
(0.39) (0.52)
Logged Land Area 0.082 0.51 0.15 0.44
(0.12) (0.19)
Logged Population -0.33 0.11 -0.23 0.47
(0.21) (0.31)
Coordination Goods 3.04 0.05 -2.03 0.03
(1.6) (0.93)
Term Length in Years 0.2 p < 0.001 -0.47 p < 0.001
(0.055) (0.073)
Mixed System -0.0065 0.97 0.11 0.68
(0.19) (0.27)
Presidential System -0.13 0.63 0.28 0.49
(0.27) (0.4)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
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The other models with change in corruption and change in private goods that had signifi-
cant results displayed the opposite pattern. Change in corruption for leaders and parties and
change in private goods for non-elections actually caused the risk of losing power through a
non-election event to decrease initially and then became insignificant with polarization. The
change in the Gini coefficient had no significant effect. The results do not present an obvious
explanation for this pattern. My experience preparing the data presents some ideas. For
example, leaders and parties, especially in presidential systems, who engage in democratic
erosion often have control over the legislature, so impeachment proceedings or votes of no
confidence are unlikely.
Another consideration is that selectorate theory overestimates the ability of voters in
the winning coalition to install a challenger. This is where democratic leaders might have a
survival advantage over autocratic leaders. Voters often must wait for elections to remove a
leader, especially in presidential and semi-presidential systems. On the other hand, parlia-
mentary systems have some control over election timing. They could theoretically use this
power to hold elections before the electorate has fully noticed democratic erosion and would
then have several years before needing to face an election. If leaders and their parties can
erode democracy quickly enough, then the winning coalition might not have a genuine op-
portunity to overthrow the leader. Future research should examine these and other possible
explanations.
Future research could also consider testing individual-level or mixed-level effects. Two
papers have applied experiments to selectorate theory (e.g., Bausch 2014; 2017), but other
individual-level methods like surveys have not been utilized in this context. Using surveys to
test selectorate theory and polarization together would allow for more precise measurements
of the causal mechanism. Surveys could directly test the strength of people’s identities.
Existing cross-national resources like the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES)
could facilitate these types of analyses. Geographic data combined with surveys could also
allow for more targeted estimates of the effects of public goods. Selectorate theory, theo-
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retically and often empirically, assumes that public goods are evenly distributed nationally.
However, leaders can target goods to geographic units that support them. Survey methods,
overall, could provide greater internal and external validity.
To an extent, the results provide an answer to the earlier question. Polarization allows
corrupt leaders to win elections despite their actions. Given the connection between cor-
ruption and democratic erosion, this signals that leaders who attack democracy can also
win elections when polarization is present. Still, further research is necessary to add more
evidence, clarify these relationships, and explain some of the unexpected results found in
other models.
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Hawkins, Kirk A., and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser. 2019. Introduction to The Ideational
Approach to Populism: Concept, Theory, and Analysis, 1–24. Edited by Kirk A. Hawkins,
Ryan E. Carlin, Levente Littvay, and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser. New York: Routledge.
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APPENDIX
Table 6: Model Summary for Gini Coefficient and Party Survival
Elections Other
Variable Est. p Est. p
Polarization 0.091 0.35 -0.013 0.93
(0.097) (0.15)
Change in Gini Coefficient 0.17 0.23 -0.28 0.29
(0.14) (0.26)
Polarization*Change in Gini Coefficient 0.022 0.8 0.21 0.11
(0.085) (0.13)
Resource Wealth 0.014 0.32 -0.003 0.91
(0.014) (0.027)
GDP Growth -2.06 0.2 -0.33 0.68
(1.6) (0.8)
Inflation -0.001 0.51 0.0 0.98
(0.0012) (0.0014)
Logged GDP per Capita 0.37 0.3 -0.16 0.77
(0.36) (0.54)
Logged Land Area 0.11 0.38 0.19 0.34
(0.13) (0.2)
Logged Population -0.4 0.07 -0.28 0.43
(0.22) (0.35)
Coordination Goods 2.77 0.07 -1.53 0.12
(1.5) (0.97)
Term Length in Years 0.18 0.002 -0.47 p < 0.001
(0.056) (0.076)
Mixed System 0.005 0.98 0.11 0.67
(0.19) (0.27)
Presidential System 0.02 0.94 0.49 0.24
(0.27) (0.42)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 7: Model Summary for Private Goods and Leader Survival
Elections Other
Variable Est. p Est. p
Polarization 0.112 0.31 0.104 0.24
(0.111) (0.0881)
Change in Private Goods 0.0327 0.47 -0.0411 0.1
(0.0454) (0.0251)
Polarization*Change in Private Goods -0.00548 .79 0.017 0.13
(0.0202) (0.0114)
Resource Wealth 0.00799 0.62 -0.0206 0.31
(0.0163) (0.0201)
Acting -1.81 0.08 1.22 p < 0.001
(1.03) (0.189)
Term-Limited -1.08 0.02
(0.472)
Female -0.437 0.29 -0.0656 0.79
(0.415) (0.241)
GDP Growth -1.33 0.3 0.00828 0.15
(1.28) (1.17)
Inflation -0.000866 0.65 0.000152 0.86
(0.00193) (0.000858)
Logged GDP per Capita 0.601 0.22 -0.3 0.4
(0.493) (0.356)
Logged Land Area 0.192 0.25 0.00828 0.95
(0.167) (0.135)
Logged Population -0.879 0.004 0.448 0.02
(0.292) (0.186)
Coordination Goods 1.16 0.43 -0.27 0.73
(1.47) (0.793)
Term Length in Years 0.0678 0.35 -0.295 p < 0.001
(0.0723) (0.0553)
Mixed System -0.145 0.52 0.0257 0.88
(0.224) (0.171)
Presidential System -1.85 0.004 -0.278 0.46
(0.644) (0.373)
Shape -0.0104 0.87 0.162 0.002
(0.062) (0.0531)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 8: Model Summary for Gini Coefficient and Leader Survival
Elections Other
Variable Est. p Est. p
Polarization 0.12 0.28 0.109 0.22
(0.112) (0.0883)
Change in Gini Coefficient 0.183 0.45 0.183 0.52
(0.243) (0.179)
Polarization*Change in Gini Coefficient -0.0292 0.85 0.0204 0.84
(0.152) (0.1)
Resource Wealth 0.00533 0.76 -0.0184 0.35
(0.0173) (0.0196)
Acting -1.86 0.07 1.21 p < 0.001
(1.03) (0.18)
Term-Limited -1.07 0.02
(0.47)
Female -0.37 0.36 -0.113 0.64
(0.404) (0.245)
GDP Growth -1.02 0.43 -1.2 0.25
(1.28) (1.05)
Inflation -0.00107 0.64 -0.000145 0.86
(0.00229) (0.000824)
Logged GDP per Capita 0.766 0.12 -0.321 0.37
(0.492) (0.354)
Logged Land Area 0.172 0.3 0.0198 0.88
(0.164) (0.134)
Logged Population -0.847 0.005 0.443 0.02
(0.292) (0.193)
Coordination Goods 1.16 0.42 -0.258 0.73
(1.44) (0.746)
Term Length in Years 0.064 0.39 -0.297 p < 0.001
(0.0749) (0.0568)
Mixed System -0.144 0.52 0.0271 0.87
(0.221) (0.165)
Presidential System -1.68 0.008 -0.172 0.63
(0.625) (0.353)
Shape 0.0013 0.99 0.17 0.001
(0.0637) (0.052)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
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